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RECENT DECISIONS

II35

WILLS-DEPENDENT RELATIVE REVOCATION WHEN REVOCATORY CODICIL CONTAINS INEFFECTIVE SUBSTITUTED BEQUEST-Testator's will, exe-:cuted in 1926, provided a trust fund for his adopted daughter, then a minor,
and named his wife as residuary legatee. By the terms of the will the daughter
was to receive the trust income after she became twenty-one and the principal
when she reached the age of thirty-five. In 1942, when the daughter was thirtyone, married, and the mother of two children, the testator added a codicil which
included the following provision: "I hereby revoke the Trust Fund in favor of
my Daughter Mildred, and substitute a lump sum of _ _ _ dollars in cash."
The testator died in I 946 without having completed the blank space in the
codicil. The probate court held 1 that the revocation was ineffective. On appeal by the widow, held, affirmed. Since the dispositive part of the codicil failed
because of an intrinsic defect of the instrument, the doctrine of dependent relative revocation applies. In Re Braun's Estate, (Pa. 1948) 56 A. (2d) 201.
The term "dependent relative revocation" has been used as a catch-all for
a number of situations in which the courts have felt that the effectiveness of an
attempted revocation of a will should depend upon some other fact or act to
which the revocation was related. 2 In general, the cases have fallen into two
broad groups: revocations contingent on the happening of an express or implied
condition, and revocations made under a mistake of law or fact. 8 There should
be little difficulty in applying the doctrine if the revocatory act is truly conditional; for example, a testator might destroy his will intending to revoke it only
if he later executed a new one. The cases of such clear conditions, however, are
rare. More often, it will be evident from the facts that the testator did not
intend the revocation to be conditional, but that he acted under a mistake. Thus
he may destroy a later will because he anticipates that this act will revive an
earlier instrument,4 or change his plan of disposition under the erroneous belie·£
that certain beneficiaries are dead. 5 Largely because of traditional unwillingness

1 Braun's Estate, (Orphan's Court of Philadelphia County, No. 539, 1947) 59
Pa. D. & C. 563.
2 In general, see I PAGE, WILLS, § 478 et seq. (1941); ATKINSON, WILLS,
§ 162 (1937); Warren, "Dependent Relative Revocation," 33 HARV. L. REv. 337
(1920); Evans, "Testamentary Revocation by Subsequent Instrument," 22 KY. L.J.
469 (1934).
8 Warren, ''Dependent Relative Revocation," 33 HARV. L. REv. 337 (1920).
4 Powell v. Powell, L.R. 1 P. & D. 209 (1866).
5 Campbell v. French, 3 Vesey Jr. 321, 30 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1797).
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to grant relief in will cases for mistake in inducement,6 the courts have tended
to treat a revocation made under ·mistake as equivalent to a conditional revocation, even though it is apparent that the condition is a :fiction. 7 Nevertheless,
the application of the doctrine of dependent relative revocation, whether in cases
of condition or mistake, is doubtless desirable insofar as it aids in carrying out
the testator's probable intention. The danger, however, is that the indiscriminate
and mechanical use of the doctrine may result in defeating rather than in effectuating the testator's intention.8 The present case poses just such a danger,
although it is very largely ignored by the court. The wording of the codicil,
says the court, makes it evident that the testator's primary purpose was not
revocation but substitution, since his "plain desire was to lift his benefaction
to his daughter out from under the trust which the will had imposed." 9 The
court notes that this interpretation of the codicil accords with the testator's presumed intent to provide for his heir and with the fact that the daughter was
approaching the age at which she would be entitled to receive the_ trust principal.10 This interpretation is persuasive. Yet it seems equally plausible, in view
of the daughter's age and marriage, that the testator may have intended to revoke
the trust fund absolutely, reserving the question whether he would later substitute any cash bequest at all.11 The court suggests that if a codicil or subsequent
will includes an express revocation as well as a new disposition, and the disposition
fails, the effectiveness of the revocation should depend upon the reason for failure of the dispositive clause. An extrinsic reason, such as incapacity of the
beneficiary to take, furnishes "no implication as to the testator's intent with
respect to the revocation in case the accompanying disposition should fail," 12
and, therefore, the revocation will be given effect. If, however, the failure is
due to an intrinsic defect in the execution of tjle instrument, the revocation may
be considered conditional and thus ineffective. This distinction between extrinsic
and intrinsic ,defects seems of questionable usefulness in seeking a testator's
intent. The distinction, however, is not essential to the decision in this case;
and there is good authority for the court's position that dependent relative
revocation may be used to nullify a revocatory clause where the instrument has
been defectively executed and the defect goes only to the dispositive provisions.18
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PAGE, WILLS,§§ 170,172 (1941).
The use of the doctrine to cover both revocations made under mistake and
conditional revocations has been criticized. Warren, "Dependent Relative Revocation,"
33 HARv. L. REV. 337 at 338 (1920). But compare Cornish, "Dependent Relative
Revocation," 5 So. CAL. L. REv. 273 (1932).
8
1 PAGE, WILLS, §§ 478, 481 (1941) and cases cited.
9
Principal case at 204.
10 Ibid.
11 Destruction of will is effective revocation in spite of unfulfilled intent to make
a new will at a later date. ATKINSON, WILLS, § 162 (1937); In Re Olmstead's Estate,
122 Cal. 224, 54 P. 745 (1898); In re Bonkowski's Estate, 266 Mich. 112, 253
N.W. 235 (1934).
12 See also In Re Melville's Estate, 245 Pa. 318, 91 A. 679 (1914); ATKINSON,
WILLS, § 162 (1937).
18 The l_eading case is Onions v. Tyrer, 2 Vern. 742, 23 Eng. Rep. 1085 (1716).
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